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 The Battle for Baghdad: Testing Hypotheses About
Insurgency From Risk Heterogeneity, Repeat
Victimization, and Denial Policing Approaches
ALEX BRAITHWAITE
School of Government and Public Policy, University of Arizona, Tucson,
Arizona, USA
SHANE D. JOHNSON
Department of Security and Crime Science, University College London,
London, UK
TheIraqiInsurgency(2003–2011)hascommonlybeencharacterizedasdemonstrating
the tendency for violence to cluster and diffuse at the local level. Recent research has
demonstrated that insurgent attacks in Iraq cluster in time and space in a manner
similar to that observed for the spread of a disease. The current study employs a var-
iety of approaches common to the scientific study of criminal activities to advance our
understanding of the correlates of observed patterns of the incidence and contagion of
insurgent attacks. We hypothesize that the precise patterns will vary from one place
to another, but that more attacks will occur in areas that are heavily populated, where
coalition forces are active, and along road networks. To test these hypotheses, we use
a fishnet to build a geographical model of Baghdad that disaggregates the city into
more than 3000 grid cell locations. A number of logistic regression models with
spatial and temporal lags are employed to explore patterns of local escalation and
diffusion. These models demonstrate the validity of arguments under each of three
models but suggest, overall, that risk heterogeneity arguments provide the most com-
pelling and consistent account of the location of insurgency. In particular, the results
demonstrate that violence is most likely at locations with greater population levels,
higher density of roads, and military garrisons.
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 Does variation in the local characteristics of places or counterinsurgency (COIN)
activities have the greater bearing upon the location, escalation, and diffusion of
insurgent violence
1 at the local level? This article explores the evolution of violent
behaviours in the Iraqi capital, Baghdad, at the peak of the Iraqi Insurgency
in 2005. Descriptions of the Iraqi Insurgency parallel those of violence elsewhere.
Specific locations—including, in this case, Mosul, Kirkuk, Basrah, and areas of
Baghdad (e.g., Sadr City)—were highlighted as violent hot spots. Violence escalated
and diffused within and between local communities. Insurgent and counter-insurgent
forces fought pitched battles at close quarters over the prospect of relatively small
territorial gains. In other words, the Iraqi Insurgency—and the Battle for Baghdad,
in particular—provides an excellent opportunity to assess competing hypotheses
regarding the location and diffusion of violence. To do so, we draw upon influential
approaches from Environmental Criminology, which, we argue, are surprisingly
under-utilized in the study of insurgency yet provide remarkably powerful accounts
of local-level patterns of these violent phenomena. Specifically, we explore expecta-
tions derived from logics regarding risk heterogeneity, near repeat victimization (or
the contagion of risk), and police disruption and deterrence.
The Battle for Baghdad was a consistent feature of the near nine-year conflict
between and amongst Iraqi insurgents and U.S.-led Coalition forces. In its first three
years, the insurgency was formed primarily out of anti-Coalition violence and
Coalition responses. The violence was re-oriented dramatically after the bombing of
the Shia al-Askari mosque in Samarra in February 2006. This bombing resulted in
the eruption of ethnic conflict as the primary source of violence, which prompted the
U.S. troop surge in the Spring of 2007.
2 This paper focuses on identifying which com-
binations of local characteristics, COIN activities, and near repeat victimization led to
the observed location and diffusion of violence, and accordingly examines the early
phase of the conflict. While we focus upon the single case of Baghdad in this article,
it is likely that our contribution could speak to insurgent campaigns elsewhere, too.
Burgeoning literatures across multiple disciplines explore the spatial clustering
and diffusion of violent political conflict and criminal activities. Different scholars,
building various theories and employing diverse methods, typically study these two
event typesseparately.However,insome caseswhile thetheorieshavedifferentnames,
and may apply to various spatial scales, similar concepts are explored. For example, in
studying terrorist attacks at the country level over time, Manus Midlarksy suggests
four mechanisms that might explain why attacks occur where they do, as follows:
(a) patterns are simply random; (b) there is heterogeneity such that some countries
are more at risk than others, but that the variation in risk across counties is stable over
time; (c) a process of reinforcement leads to the risk of attack within a country being
elevated following an attack in that country; and, (d) a process of contagion, whereby
attacks in one country temporarily elevate the risk of attacks in those nearby.
3
Similar mechanisms have been explored in the Environmental Criminology
literature to explain patterns of urban crime at the micro level. For example, it
appears that the risk of residential burglary is not random, with some neighborhoods,
street segments, and households at greater risk than others. Of particular relevance is
the finding that the risk of repeat victimization of the same household is highest in the
period that immediately follows a burglary.
4 Moreover, following a burglary at one
home the risk to those nearby is also temporarily elevated (referred to as near repeat
victimization).
5 Possible explanations for such patterns mirror those discussed above.
That is, such patterns could simply reflect a simple (random) Poisson process, or be
The Battle for Baghdad 113
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 explained in terms of risk heterogeneity (a mixed Poisson process) whereby some
homes or neighborhoods are more at risk than others—with this variation in risk
being stable over time. In the case of the latter, this would suggest some targets are
simply more vulnerable than others, and different offenders target them. An alterna-
tive is that the risk of burglary has a contagion-like quality, with the risk of burglary
being temporarily elevated following each event. In the event that this is the case, the
most parsimonious explanation would be that having successfully targeted one home,
the same offender subsequently returns to that or nearby (similar) targets.
6 A further
possibility is that patterns of crime are explained by a combination of such processes.
We look to build upon the overlap between these two literatures. Both criminal
and insurgent activities share some underlying characteristics. First, both sets of
actors (insurgents and criminals) are subject to constraints. This is true both in terms
of their mobility and the opportunities of which they will be aware and capable of
exploiting. Second, both types of activity are the outcome of strategic interactions
between multiple actors—criminal and police force, insurgent and military. In other
words, the actions of one actor affect the other. The whereabouts of the police or the
military directly influences where criminals and insurgents are willing and able to
target. In the case that the activity of military or the police suppresses that of their
adversary (criminal or insurgent), the latter will aim to avoid the locations the other
is deployed to. However, we also recognize that there is an important departure
between criminal and insurgent activities with respect to their strategic interaction
with the authorities. In particular, insurgency is distinct insofar as it often also
involves the direct targeting of the military. By contrast, criminals are most typically
motivated to avoid locations being policed.
We offer a multivariate analysis of the local dynamics of violence in the Iraqi
capital, Baghdad, across a six-month period in 2005. This analysis is more fine-
grained than is typical of analyses of conflict contagion, and is in line with a growing
trend towards focusing upon intra-state or internal diffusion. This focus allows for
an opportunity to approximate the effect of loci-specific characteristics (risk hetero-
geneity) on patterns of violence. We also draw upon environmental criminological
approaches to the study of repeat victimization to offer a more theoretical account
of spatial dependence=escalation between violent events. Finally, we also assess the
influence of government actions (policing=COIN activities) upon the clustering and
diffusion of insurgent violence.
This article proceeds as follows. First, we highlight key contributions in the
extant literature, and highlight competing hypotheses in response to the core
research question of the study: Do heterogeneous local characteristics or counterin-
surgency (COIN) activities have the greater bearing upon the location, escalation,
and diffusion of insurgent and terrorist violence at the local level? These competing
hypotheses are derived from logics of near repeat victimization, risk heterogeneity,
and the effects of policing. Second, to test these competing hypotheses we design a
suitable multivariate research strategy, employing logistic regression models with
spatial and temporal lags. Third, we discuss the results of these analyses with a view
towards offering academic and policy implications.
Background and Competing Hypotheses
In this section we detail an emerging literature within the conflict processes
community that has re-oriented focus towards the sub-national diffusion of conflict
114 A. Braithwaite and S. D. Johnson
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 and violence. This research pays attention to the tendency for violence to escalate
and diffuse at the subnational level—i.e., to trigger more violence at the same and
nearby locations, respectively.
7 In doing so, we lay out a series of claims regarding
the extant empirical literature on insurgency and terrorism that prompt us to draw
upon environmental criminological approaches.
We begin with the broad claim that criminological approaches operate best at
the local level, a scale that is typically not the focus of social science studies of insur-
gency and terrorism, but that is crucial to accounting for local diffusion of events. To
this we add three more specific claims. First, we contend that both Political Science
and Environmental Criminology enjoy rich traditions of paying attention to the issue
of spatial heterogeneity in the distribution of violent and criminal activities. We build
upon these traditions via a broad discussion of the importance of paying attention to
risk heterogeneity in the local-level study of insurgency. Second, we claim that con-
cepts from research on (near) repeat victimization neatly complement more abstract
notions of risk (spatial) heterogeneity and provide a valuable micro-level account of
the observation of spatial dependence between insurgent events. Third, we claim that
criminological theory regarding the effect of police activity that aims to deter or
disrupt criminal activity (hereafter, denial-based policing) can usefully inform expec-
tations regarding the strategic interaction between insurgent violence and COIN
activities. Each of these three approaches is used to derive testable hypotheses
regarding the local diffusion of insurgent violence.
Research on Risk Heterogeneity
As discussed above, with respect to patterns of (near) repeat criminal victimization,
the risk heterogeneity (or flag) hypothesis
8 suggests that space-time patterns of vic-
timization can actually be explained by time-stable variation in risk across potential
targets.
9 The idea is that some places will be more vulnerable than others and that
this vulnerability will be perceived by a variety of offenders who will exploit it. In
the case of burglary, ethnographic research indicates that offenders express common
preferences for the characteristics of homes that make them attractive targets.
10 And,
research that has explicitly examined this explanation
11 suggests that risk heterogen-
eity explains some (but not all) of the variation in space-time patterns of burglary,
making it an important mechanism to study.
Following the pre-theoretical framework of Benjamin Most and Harvey Starr,
we suggest, in turn, that risk heterogeneity is reflected in the distribution of local
factors that affect insurgents’ opportunities and willingness to carry out violent
attacks.
12 Two potential sources of the spatial pattern of insurgency are highlighted
in the existing literature: local infrastructure and communication networks, as well as
demographic distributions. In both cases, it is argued that the distribution of viol-
ence simply reflects the similar distribution of one or more of these local attributes;
the likelihood of violence across a set of locations is assumed to vary according to
the characteristics of those locations. Moreover, the local presence of infrastructure
and specific demographic distributions alters both the opportunity for and the
willingness of insurgents to carry out an attack.
A key characteristic of the Iraqi Insurgency was the employment of improvised
explosive devices (IEDs). Indeed, it is estimated that IEDs accounted for 63% of
Coalition casualties through to the end of 2007.
13 Given that these were most typi-
cally deployed in the form of roadside bombs targeting military patrols, it seems
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 reasonable to contend that the presence of and access to road networks played a piv-
otal role in determining the location of insurgent activities in Iraq. This relationship
has been demonstrated in the case of recent violence in the North Caucasus. In his
study of the region, Yuri Zhukov offers a comprehensive theoretical and empirical
treatment of the role of road networks in insurgent campaigns. He demonstrates that
road networks are the most important factor in determining where conflict is located
and to where it is able and likely to spread.
14
A second element of infrastructure that is speculatively associated with increases
in the opportunity for insurgent activity is cellular (mobile) phone technology. This
technology is thought by some to have been an ‘‘explosive technology for insur-
gents’’ in Iraq.
15 Jacob Shapiro and Nils Weidman comprehensively demonstrate,
however, that areas enjoying increased cell phone technology coverage actually
observed reductions in insurgent violence between 2005 and 2008. They posit that
this is likely because local cell phone coverage enhances counterterrorism opportu-
nities and capabilities more readily than it aids insurgents.
16
With respect to risk heterogeneity, therefore, we have an initial expectation that
the likelihood of attacks at a specific location is conditioned by opportunities
afforded by the availability of infrastructure:
Hypothesis 1 (H1): Higher levels of insurgent activity are expected at
locations at which local infrastructure provides an
opportunity for insurgents to carry out attacks.
To better understand the impact that risk heterogeneity has upon the willingness
to carry out attacks, we look to the distribution of populations. To assess the effect
of the 2007 surge upon Iraqi quality of life, John Agnew and colleagues draw upon
data from nighttime light satellite imagery. This data (from the Defense Meteoro-
logical Satellite Program-Operational Linescan System [DMSP-OLS]), at 2.8km
pixel resolution is viewed as denoting that the local population has access to elec-
tricity. They demonstrate that other populated areas observed increases in nighttime
light activity but Baghdad experienced a decrease. Hence, the observed decrease in
violence most likely should not be attributed to COIN activity but, rather, to the fact
that large portions of the city’s population were displaced.
17
It has also been demonstrated that demographic distributions matter insofar as
they reflect the divisions that emerge between ethnic groups. Using a computational
model, Nils Weidmann and Idean Salehyan explore violence in Baghdad in the con-
text of inter-ethnic relations. They pay attention to the underlying distribution (or
segregation) of distinct ethnic groups and the effect of likely migration patterns upon
subsequent patterns of violence. In addition, their agent-based model (ABM) is used
to quantify the likely impact of hypothetical changes in the local provision of poli-
cing. The model suggests both that violence is driven by patterns in ethnic popula-
tions rather than prior violence, per se, and that even small changes in policing
(notably early interventions in response to violence) could pay significant dividends.
They conclude that the troop surge of 2007 mitigated levels of violence.
18
In the Weidman and Salehyan ABM, agents respond to their co-ethnics by
choosing whether to engage in violence or instead move to a safer neighborhood.
This aligns with the broader literature on Iraq, which suggests that frequent interac-
tions between rival ethnic groups best account for the violence that continues to
plague Iraq to this day. This literature has tended to conclude that any post-surge
116 A. Braithwaite and S. D. Johnson
D
o
w
n
l
o
a
d
e
d
 
b
y
 
[
U
n
i
v
e
r
s
i
t
y
 
C
o
l
l
e
g
e
 
L
o
n
d
o
n
]
 
a
t
 
0
6
:
1
7
 
1
2
 
M
a
r
c
h
 
2
0
1
5
 peace dividend resulted not from increased COIN activity but, rather, from separ-
ation resulting from inter-ethnic cleansing.
19 Elsewhere it is suggested that the
violent conflict that erupted between Shia and Sunni militias came about not just
because of the ethnic cleavage within Iraqi society but also because of the mainte-
nance of the U.S. occupation.
20
Whether driven directly by ethnic cleavages or, rather, simply the presence of
suitable targets, we anticipate that the likelihood of attacks at a specific location
is conditioned by the willingness to target populations:
H2: Higher levels of insurgent activity are expected at locations with
high populations, because they define greater willingness for insur-
gents to carry out attacks.
Research on (Near) Repeat Victimization
It is well established that individual episodes of violence within broader sub-national
conflicts commonly exhibit spatial dependencies.
21 However, papers revealing such
patterns rarely offer detailed accounts of the factors driving them. Whilst both
Environmental Criminology and Political Science share in common the employment
of the disease analogy to describe the distribution and potential diffusion of criminal
and violent political activities, respectively, the former has the stronger tradition of
offering micro-level accounts of these distributions.
Early research concerned with the spatial analysis of crime examined patterns at
spatial scales such as provinces
22 or zones within cities.
23 But in the last three dec-
ades, the focus of both empirical and theoretical research has been directed towards
patterns at the micro level of places, where places might refer to street segments,
24
individual locations such as homes,
25 or particular facilities.
26 The motivating prin-
ciple of so doing is that crime events occur when there is a convergence in space and
time of offenders, suitable opportunities for crime, and the absence of capable guar-
dians, whoever or whatever they might be.
27 These convergence settings occur at spe-
cific micro level places and hence there is an increasing interest in studying patterns
of crime at the micro, rather than meso or macro levels.
Demonstrating the utility of this approach, research shows that particular types
of places are more at risk than are others and that there exist sharp discontinuities in
risk, such that while one home or one street segment might be at a high risk of victi-
mization, those adjacent or nearby need not be.
28 In addition to examining variation
in risk across places, research increasingly examines how risk varies over time at the
micro level of place. As discussed, research on burglary victimization (for example)
indicates that once victimized a home is at an elevated risk in the future, but this elev-
ation in risk decays at an exponential rate. While theories of risk heterogeneity could
explain such patterns, the difference in risk across homes necessary to do so would be
unrealistic and computer simulation experiments demonstrate that risk heterogeneity
alone is unlikely to explain observed patterns.
29 The alternative explanation is that
one offence temporarily influences the risk of victimization at the burgled home, most
likely because repeat victimization is the work of a returning offender. According to
this perspective, having victimized a home, the offender acquires new knowledge
about that location such as the likely risks and rewards associated with returning
to commit further offenses. However, as this knowledge will be forgotten
30 or the per-
ceived accuracy of it will fade over time, according to this perspective a swift return to
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 previously victimized homes is anticipated to be likely. Interviews with offenders
31
and the analysis of crimes detected by the police
32 support this view.
If offender learning associated with their victimization of particular places does
shape the likelihood with which offenders will return, logic—encapsulated in the
offender as forager hypothesis
33—suggests that it will also temporarily affect the like-
lihood of them targeting those nearby (referred to as near repeat victimization to dif-
ferentiate it from repeat victimization of the exact same location). To explain, the first
law of geography states that things that are close to each other are more similar than
those further apart
34 and hence acquired knowledge (e.g., ease of access, levels of
natural surveillance, likely rewards) that is relevant to one location is likely to apply
to those nearby. As with repeat victimization of the same home, uncertainty as to the
accuracy of this knowledge will increase with elapsed time. And, while such learning
could increase the risk of burglary at particular locations permanently, returning to
the same locations repeatedly will eventually incur an elevated (perceived or actual)
risk of apprehension for the offender, and hence the offender as forager is expected
to move on. Work on ‘‘near repeat’’ victimization has used techniques originally
developed to detect disease contagion—such as a variant of the Knox Test—to see
whether the elevated risk associated with repeat victimization of the same home does
extend to their neighbors.
35 A great many papers so far published suggest this to be
the case, and while the precise patterns vary across locations and crime types, atypical
characterization is that the risk of (say) burglary is elevated for homes within 200m of
the burgled home for about two weeks.
36 Moreover, interviews with offenders,
37 the
analysis of crimes detected by the police,
38 and computer simulations
39 suggest that
the reasons for these patterns are consistent with the offender as forager hypothesis.
Statistical techniques initially developed to detect disease contagion
40 have been
used to show that in the case of residential burglary
41 and other crimes,
42 events
cluster in space and time, and do so more than would be expected if the risk of crime
could be explained in terms of risk heterogeneity alone. Other work uses micro-
simulation
43 and agent-based models
44 to examine the extent to which the two types
of processes—risk heterogeneity and contagion—have a part to play in generating
space-time patterns of burglary, and suggests that both explanations are required
to explain the precise patterns.
Inspiredbytheworkconcernedwithurbancrime,more recentworkhasemployed
the statistical approach described above to examine patterns of Improvised Explosive
Device (IED) attacks in Iraq and similar violence elsewhere.
45 In one instance, crimi-
nological research has been employed to motivate analysis of so-called ‘‘microcycles’’
of violence as a means of identifying evidence of burstiness in events. Work in this vein
has attempted to move beyond mere characterization of global space-time dependence
to be able to account for the role of individual events in the genesis of localized bursts
of activity—the microcycles. Evidence of microcycles has been uncovered in the cases
of Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) violence in Spain andFrente Farabundo Martı ´para
la Liberacio ´n Nacional (FMLN) violence in El Salvador.
46
Along similar lines, Shane Johnson and Alex Braithwaite have articulated a series
of expectations as to why such patterns might be anticipated. Attrition-based strategies
encourage insurgents to concentrate their efforts on specific local targets to exhaust
their opponents’ willingness to continue to engage. At the same time, insurgents use
the evidence of these concentrations of attacks as a means of building morale amongst
their support bases. The repeated targeting of a location acts, in other words, as a
demonstration of the insurgents’ collective ability to impose its will against the
118 A. Braithwaite and S. D. Johnson
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 government and occupying forces.
47 These arguments regarding the propensity for
insurgentsto cluster their attacks in space and time are reflected inone ofthe key work-
ing assumptions of U.S.=Coalition forces: insurgents will continue to target locations at
which they have previously been successful until COIN actions force a change.
48
The central conclusion from this research is that just like patterns of urban
crime, IED attacks also cluster in space and time:
H3: Higher levels of insurgent activity are expected at or close to
locations where attacks have previously been successful.
Research on Denial Policing
It is commonly expected that counterinsurgency (COIN) activities have a strong
bearing upon both the location and the potential for diffusion of insurgent attacks.
A number of important studies have addressed the impact of COIN on subsequent
levels of insurgency but at an aggregate level and, thus, are unable to directly specify
itslocaleffects.
49Empiricalassessmentsofinsurgent-COINinteractionatthe locallevel
are relatively few and far between due to a lack of data. In an attempt to redress this
imbalance, Monica Duffy Toft and Yuri Zhukov distinguish between denial and pun-
ishment strategies of policing. ‘‘When implemented effectively, denial transforms the
conflict zone into a closed system—insurgents are unable to flee to or reinforce opera-
tions from adjacent areas.’’
50By contrast,punishment strategies are designed to impose
pain to undermine insurgent resolve. In practical terms, denial is observed in efforts
designed to restrict movement and to disrupt communication networks, including
efforts to establish a cordon around a location. Punishment is measured in terms of
kinetic force. Their conclusion, which chimes with that of the broader insurgency
literature, is that denial is the preferred strategy to counter insurgency.
51
To build upon a rich tradition of criminological research, Gary LaFree and
co-authors have sought to explore the relevant deterrence and backlash models of
policing. They do so in the case of British counterterrorism activities in Northern
Ireland between 1969 and 1992. Their state-level analysis uncovers much stronger
support for the idea of violent backlashes (rather than deterred activities) in response
to counterterrorism activities.
52
The ABM of Weidman and Salehyan suggests that early commitment of
resources to COIN activity could enhance prospects for successful COIN.
53 This ten-
tative conclusion chimes with the findings of Enterline and Greig who find that high
numbers of troops devoted early in a COIN—what they characterize as the Shinseki
Plan—is the most successful form of COIN.
54 Andrew Linke and colleagues use a
space-time Granger causality technique to explore insurgent-coalition interaction
for the period 2004–2009. For this they employ the Wikileaks datasets. They
demonstrate strong reciprocal trends indicative of a ‘‘tit-for-tat’’ strategy on the part
of insurgents.
55
In a similar vein, using a novel extension of the Knox Test, Braithwaite and
Johnson examine how space-time patterns of COIN activity affect those of IED
attacks and vice versa. To better understand the interactions, rather than analyzing
all forms of COIN action in the aggregate, they distinguish between those COIN
actions that are targeted in nature and those that are less so. In contrast to the find-
ings of Linke and colleagues, their analysis suggests that COIN operations closely
follow the incidence of insurgent attacks but not vice-versa.
56
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 Collectively, these extant studies and the notion of denial policing suggest a pair
of competing hypotheses:
H4: Higher levels of insurgent activity are expected at or close to
locations where COIN activities have previously been located
(tit-for-tat).
Or:
H5: Lower levels of insurgent activity are expected at or close to locations
where COIN activities have previously been located (denialpolicing).
Research Design
We have proposed five testable hypotheses reflecting expectations derived from the
logics of three key Environmental Criminology approaches: risk heterogeneity, near
repeat victimization, and denial policing. In this section we detail an appropriate
research design to test these hypotheses on data characterizing levels of insurgent
violence, COIN activities, and environmental characteristics at the local level in
Baghdad at the peak of the Iraqi Insurgency in 2005.
Measuring Insurgency
Our dependent variable, ‘‘insurgent violence,’’ includes details of 666 IED explosions
that occurred in the area in and around Baghdad between January 1, 2005 and
June 30, 2005. These data come from information reported to the Multi-National
Force-Iraq (MNF-I) through daily Significant Activity (SIGACTs) reports. These
data were made available by the Reconstruction Operations Center and whilst they
are formally treated as ‘‘sensitive,’’ they have been employed elsewhere in academic
research. The data are geocoded to a resolution of 100m (or better).
57 There is now a
wealth of micro-level data (including aggregated versions of a more complete time
series of SIGACTS data) available through the Empirical Studies of Conflict
(ESOC) data project at Princeton University.
58 However, the ESOC collection
includes details on the identity of the initiator and target only for the period April
2006 to September 2007 when the conflict was essentially an inter-ethnic conflict.
59
Thus, we opt to use the more fine-grained data covering the six months in 2005 that
we feel best reflect the height of insurgent-COIN interactions.
Modeling Approach
In their assessment of space-time co-evolution of insurgent and counterinsurgent
activities in Iraq, Braithwaite and Johnson use a novel extension to the Knox
approach mentioned briefly above. To explain, in the case of the Knox Test, for a
set of events, each observation is compared with every other and the distance and
time between them calculated. A contingency table is then populated to summarize
the distribution of event pairs that occur within particular space-time intervals of
each other (e.g., within 1km and 1 week of each other). The observed distribution
is then compared with what would be expected, assuming the timing and location
of events are independent. Instead of examining patterns for a single type of
event—a univariate analysis—Braithwaite and Johnson use a bivariate approach
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 to see how the timing and location of one set of events (IED attacks) is related to
that of another (COIN action).
60
The aim of the Knox Test is to estimate the extent to which events cluster in
space and time above and beyond what would be expected, given that there is likely
to be risk heterogeneity, whereby some locations will be more at risk of attacks than
others. On the one hand, controlling for the influence of risk heterogeneity is a virtue
of the test. On the other, doing so means that the explanatory contribution of spe-
cific (say) environmental factors cannot be estimated. A further related issue with
the Knox approach is that the units of observation are the events of interest (e.g.,
IED attacks). Thus, the units of observation are not fixed in space and very different
data-generating processes could lead to the same results. To illustrate, consider that
if many events occurred near to each other in space and time and did so around the
same fixed location in space, the same pattern would emerge in the contingency table
as in the case where events occur near to each other in space and time but where
there is a spatial drift in the locations where they occur.
As an alternative to this fluid framework, the majority of studies of violence of
this kind in Iraq and Afghanistan choose to fix the spatial dimension of the unit of
observation at either the district
61 or the neighborhood
62 level. However, whilst these
reasonably reflect the scale at which Coalition COIN activity decisions may have
been taken, it is not at all clear that this is a geography that influences or neatly con-
tains insurgent behaviors. Accordingly, we opt to employ an alternative approach to
analysis. Following a common practice in Environmental Criminology and an
emerging trend in empirical studies of civil war,
63 we examine how the likelihood
of events occurring at particular fixed locations varies over time. Specifically, we
generate a fishnet that divides Baghdad into (64 54¼) 3,456 equally sized grid cell
locations. This facilitates estimation of the contribution of time-stable factors (risk
heterogeneity) and those that are dynamic (contagion). This consequently facilitates
competitive testing of our five hypotheses.
Measuring Risk Heterogeneity
To test the implications of H1 regarding the importance of opportunities in deter-
mining the heterogeneity of risks of attacks at the local level, we operationalize four
independent variables. The first three of these characterize the density of different
road types within the local grid cell. The first two represent counts of the number
of ‘‘major roads’’ and ‘‘residential roads’’ within the local cell. The third then pro-
vides an interaction of these two: ‘‘major and residential roads.’’ Data on the road
network were obtained from the Open Street Map (OSM) database.
64 The available
data identify the location of road network edges, and also differentiate between the
different types of road link—thus allowing us to determine for each grid cell location
whether or not it contains roads and of which type.
In addition, we generate a binary variable simply indicating whether the local
grid cell intersects with a ‘‘military garrison.’’ We digitized the location of the garri-
son established at the former Baghdad International Airport. We expect that cells
containing a garrison are significantly less likely to experience insurgent attacks,
because these are areas to which the Coalition committed significant levels of defens-
ive forces and resources.
To test H2, we operationalize a measure of the density of the prevailing popu-
lation within each of the local grid cells. Population data are not available at this
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 local scale, thus we proxy population using estimates of the ambient population.
These are obtained from the Oakridge National Laboratory (ORNL) Landscan
database, which provides estimates for regular-sized cells of 1km by 1km for the
entire world. This measure is captured using census data, remote sensing of land
usage and cover, and nighttime visualization of levels of electrification. The spatial
resolution at which these data are available is convenient in that it represents a
meaningful scale of geography over which to study insurgent and COIN action.
For this reason, we use the LandScan grid to define our unit of observation (as
noted above).
Unfortunately, we do not have dynamic data on the whereabouts of different
ethnic groups at this spatial scale. Data are available capturing the initial
distribution of ethnic groups in parts of Baghdad—measured in 2003—to detail
the influence of ethnicity upon the location of violence. However, when overlapped
with our spatial scale, we lose a significant proportion of our observations. Accord-
ingly, we opt not to include a measure of ethnic divisions.
65
Measuring Space-Time Dynamics
To facilitate the modeling (for more detail, see below) of the influence of previous
attacks and of those nearby (key elements of repeat victimization), we generate a
three-dimensional matrix to represent the number of events that occur in each of
the 64 54 cells for each of the 26 weeks for which we have data. From this, we gen-
erate a set of three pairs of spatial and temporal lag variables. We measure IED
attacks at t-1 and t-2 at location i, as well as locations one and two grid cells removed
from i, which we refer to as the first and second buffers. Evidence of near repeat
victimization (and thus in support of H3) would take the form of positive coefficient
estimates for these parameters.
Measuring COIN=Policing Activity
To test H4 and H5, we operationalize measures of Coalition COIN activities. To
explore the effects of denial policing, in particular, we create a variable that counts
the number of cordon=search operations carried out in each cell at each time point.
Our SIGACTs data include details on 373 such operations. We isolate cordon=
search operations, in particular, because these are tactics employed with the specific
goal of undermining insurgent capacity and, thus, are most reflective of strategies to
deny. In particular, we operationalize these COIN activities in three pairs of spatial
and temporal lags—replicating our approach for the test of H3 (discussed above).
Thus we have counts of cordon=search events at t, t-1, and t-2 for grid celli, and
its first and second ring of buffer cells.
Model Specification
The equation below shows the model used in the case where current IED attacks are
used to predict future occurrences of IED attacks. The first two sets of terms are
time-lagged variables that are used to model the diffusion of risk from within the
same cell and the set of adjacent (buffer) cells. Rather than modeling diffusion from
only the immediately neighbouring cells, we do so for the first- and second-order
neighbours. Similarly, rather than assuming that the likelihood of events will be
122 A. Braithwaite and S. D. Johnson
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 influenced by what happened last week, we include two temporal lags in the model.
The model is easily extended to include additional terms for other types of events,
such as COIN activity—for which we also include a set of spatial and temporal
lag terms as detailed above. The remaining terms represent those factors included
in our model that vary over space but that are time-invariant, such as the ambient
population and the configuration of the street network. Of course, for any such
model there will be numerous omitted variables. Some of these will vary for known
geographic areas, whereas for others, how their influence varies spatially will be
unknown. To try to capture some of the effects of the former—so that their influence
is not confused with the influences of those factors that are explicitly modeled—we
include fixed effects terms for the nine districts in Baghdad. Accordingly, we end up
with a model specified as follows:
Celli;j;t ¼
X 2
a¼1
b Celli;j;t a þ
X 2
a¼1
X 2
b¼1
1
b:8
b Bufferb;t a þ bAmbientPopi;j
þ
X 10
n¼1
b Districti;j;n þ
X 3
R¼1
bRoadi;j;R þ bGarrisoni;j þ ei;j;t
Where,
. Celli,j,t is the dependent variable to be modeled and is a binary indicator of whether
or not an IED attack occurred in celli in week t (where t varies from 1 to 26);
. Celli,j,t-a is an independent variable that represents the time-lagged count of events
of a particular type in celli in week t-a (where a varies from 1 to 2);
Figure 1. Map of IED explosions and key covariates across Baghdad, January to June, 2005
(road data acquired from OpenStreetMap).
The Battle for Baghdad 123
D
o
w
n
l
o
a
d
e
d
 
b
y
 
[
U
n
i
v
e
r
s
i
t
y
 
C
o
l
l
e
g
e
 
L
o
n
d
o
n
]
 
a
t
 
0
6
:
1
7
 
1
2
 
M
a
r
c
h
 
2
0
1
5
 . Bufferi,j,t-a is an independent variable that represents the space-time lagged count
of events of a particular type in a bufferb in week t-a (where a varies from 1 to 2);
. Ambient Pop is the LandScan estimate of the ambient population for a given cell;
. The Road variables are a set of binary variables that indicate whether there is a
road of each type R in celli (where roads are classified as either residential or
major roads);
. Garrison is a binary variable that indicates whether celli is located within an area
that is part of a military garrison;
. The District variables are a set of binary variables, one for each of nine districts
(minus a reference category), that indicate the geographic district within which
celli is located;
. The bs are coefficients estimated using maximum likelihood methods—
specifically, a logistic regression; and
. ei,t is the residual error term.
The distribution of some of the key elements of this model specification is visua-
lized in the map in Figure 1. This map, which covers the whole of Baghdad, identifies
the point locations of the 666 IED explosions recorded within this area between June
and January 2005. The map also depicts (in order on the legend) the 1km 1km
grid used in the analyses, the nine districts of Baghdad, the airport garrison, and
the major and residential (all) roads.
Results
Table 1 details the results of four logistic regression models exploring the likelihood
of observing at least one IED attack at a locale in a particular week. This binary
outcome is modeled, respectively, as a product of factors characterizing risk
heterogeneity (Model 1), near repeat victimization (Model 2), and denial policing
(Model 3) approaches. Model 4 then combines each set of covariates in a full
specification.
Model 1 shows that each of our indicators of risk heterogeneity significantly
predicts which cells will include some IED attacks. Insurgents very clearly target
locations with high levels of population and road infrastructure coverage, and
appear to avoid the airport garrison more than would be expected on a chance basis.
These findings are in line with our expectations.
Model 2 identifies strong evidence of escalatory and contagious process consist-
ent with the logic of (near) repeat victimization. Prior levels of attacks (at both t-1
and t-2) both at the same location and nearby strongly predict the occurrence of
IEDs at celli in the current periodt.
Model 3 returns consistently positive coefficient estimates on the parameters
measuring cordon=search activities in celli and nearby locations over the previous
two time periods. The levels of statistical significance are not consistent across each
of these parameters, however, suggesting that the effects are not equal at different
spatial and temporal scales. In fact, and in contrast to the pattern observed for
IED attacks, the effect appears to be strongest for COIN operations that occurred
in the second spatial buffer two weeks prior to the period of interest. This provides
some evidence that is consistent with tit-for-tat accounts, but may also suggest that
rather than completely suppressing insurgent activity, denial policing might instead
relocate or displace it to nearby locations.
124 A. Braithwaite and S. D. Johnson
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 Finally, Model 4 offers a competitive test of each of these models. Here we can
assess both the changes in individual parameter estimates (as compared to them-
selves in Models 1 to 3), as well as the Akaike information criterion (AIC) summary
of model fit. In the first instance, we can clearly see that the risk heterogeneity para-
meters remain strongly significant as predictors of IED attacks. At the same time,
the second buffer parameters lose statistical significance, suggesting that patterns
of near repeat victimization are much more contained spatially. Finally, we see that
all but two of the COIN parameter estimates largely lose statistical significance.
These general observations are reinforced by the AIC estimates. The AIC provides
a means of judging the relative explanatory power of the different models. In parti-
cular, it provides a means of judging that balances between the goodness of fit of the
model to the underlying data-generating process and the complexity of the model
(the number of parameters therein). In this instance, the AIC shows us that whilst
the full model performs best, it is only marginally better than the notably more
parsimonious risk heterogeneity model.
Discussion and Conclusion
This article was motivated by a desire to uncover whether variation in the local char-
acteristics of places, counterinsurgency (COIN) activities, or local contagion effects
most notably influence where insurgent attacks occur. We developed a simple set of
four logistic regression models to test five hypotheses reflecting three prominent
perspectives from Environmental Criminology: ‘‘risk heterogeneity,’’ ‘‘near repeat
victimization,’’ and ‘‘denial policing.’’
Our models suggest a consistent influence of the first two. By contrast, however,
we highlight a much weaker role for prior COIN activities in determining where
insurgency occurs. This may well be because COIN activities have neither or both
of the effects hypothesized; that is to say that they may both reduce insurgent oppor-
tunities to attack (the expectation of denial policing logics) whilst also increasing the
desire to do so (the expectation of tit-for-tat logics). Additionally, we note that the
association observed might suggest that COIN activity does not entirely suppress or
directly encourage it but instead might displace their activity geographically. In the
case of urban crime, the best available evidence
66 suggests that policing and other
geographically focused crime prevention activities do not typically displace criminal
activity spatially. Possible explanations for this finding articulated in the literature
are that criminals have limited activity spaces and so are deterred when local oppor-
tunities are blocked, and that opportunities for crime are not uniformly distributed
in the environment, meaning that when one opportunity is removed, alternatives
may not exist nearby and so offending is reduced. In the case of insurgency, the
actors involved may be more motivated to seek out alternative targets, and while tar-
get attractiveness may vary, there may be many possible locations that would be suit-
able for IED attacks, meaning that some forms of COIN action, particularly perhaps
that which is acutely focused geographically, may simply relocate insurgent activity
to localities nearby.
These findings are very much preliminary at this stage. Nonetheless, they suggest
that insurgency displays similar patterns at the local level as civil wars more broadly
display at the national and regional level.
67 Future work might aim to examine the
extent to which the micro-level patterns observed here are apparent for other forms
of political violence using a similar approach to that described here. It might also
126 A. Braithwaite and S. D. Johnson
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 build on the work reported here to develop forecasting models intended to predict
where further IED attacks are most likely. As with research concerned with urban
crime, such models might differentiate between long-term
68 and short-term
69 predic-
tions to inform different COIN strategies. Our statistical model includes parameters
that estimate the influence of time-stable factors and those that are more dynamic,
such as the timing and location of recent attacks. We suggest that the inclusion of
both types of influence would be a sensible way forward in the development of fore-
casting models intended to predict where events are most likely to happen next,
where next might be the next day or week. Models intended to predict longer-term
trends may emphasize the role of recent activity somewhat less, perhaps focusing
more on characteristics of the environment to identify risky places. What factors best
predict the timing and location of future attacks is, of course, an empirical question
and we hope that future research will explore this issue.
One weakness of the approach reported here (and elsewhere), is that while het-
erogeneity is considered in terms of environmental influences, the underlying pro-
cesses that drive observed patterns are essentially assumed to be homogeneous. To
explain, consider that in one area an IED attack or COIN activity might encourage
further insurgent activity. However, in another area, the outcome might be rather
different, with insurgent activity being suppressed. If such variation exists, it may
be random insofar as it is not possible to identify regularities in observed patterns.
However, there may be systematic differences in the extent to which particular out-
comes are triggered by one action or another. Similarly, there may be systematic
differences as far as when one outcome is more likely than another. For instance,
insurgents are unlikely to target the exact same locations infinitely as there would
be little left to target and the risk of capture or disruption will increase over time.
Hence, the relationship between the event history at a location and changes in the
probability of further attacks may be non-linear, with the likelihood of attacks
initially increasing, but subsequently decreasing when the benefits of so doing
decline and the risks increase to unacceptable levels. Some of the challenges
for future research will be to articulate theoretical expectations as to how and
why such mechanisms might vary over sp a c ea n dt i m e ,a n dt ot h e nt e s tt h e m
empirically.
The data analyzed here represent a sample of that recorded by the military. As
such, it is unlikely to provide a complete picture and there will be some bias in terms
of what is recorded and what is not. Given that the data are used to inform military
action, we have no reason to suspect that data will be omitted systematically. There
is no way of objectively assessing the extent of such bias and the same issues are, of
course, associated with any studies that rely on secondary sources of data (insti-
tutional or open source), whether they be studies of crime
70 or insurgency.
71 It is
important to acknowledge the potential limitations of the data.
Another issue concerns the units of analysis. Here we analyze patterns observed
for 1km by 1km grid cells. This was partly because this was the lowest level of res-
olution at which data regarding the ambient population were available, but also
because this seemed a meaningful spatial scale (i.e., we could have aggregated the
data to larger areal units). However, it is well known that different outcomes may
be observed for analyses conducted using different areal units
72 and this should be
borne in mind. That said, the choice of areal unit selected here, we argue, is both
meaningful theoretically and practically—perhaps the two most important consid-
erations that should guide the selection of units of analysis.
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 Future research could also look to further explore patterns of violence on
specific road segments. Some prior research exists that demonstrates that road ends,
such as cul-de-sacs and dead ends, are especially prone to IED attacks. In that study,
the researchers suggested that this is likely due to these locations exposing COIN
convoy vulnerabilities.
73 Furthermore, it could prove worthwhile to assess the
impact of demographic heterogeneity as it maps onto road and neighborhood net-
works. Anecdotal evidence suggests, for instance, that the edges between different
ethnic neighborhoods attracted a lot of sectarian violence in Baghdad.
74
To conclude, the current study provides further evidence that IED attacks are
not randomly distributed geographically and tests a series of hypotheses as to why
this is the case. It demonstrates that risk heterogeneity, near repeat victimization,
and denial policing approaches from Environmental Criminology each contribute
to our understanding of the observed space-time clustering of IED attacks. Of these
explanations, however, it appears that in the current case, risk heterogeneity is
particularly important. Finally, the study supports the suggestion that research con-
cerning insurgency and terrorism more broadly could benefit from considerations of
the contribution of environmental criminological theories and empirical approaches
to analysis.
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